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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Spectacor Management Group ("Spectacor") initiated this 
diversity action as a result of a disagreement with a former 
senior level executive over severance pay and benefits. The 
defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Spectacor had 
breached an oral contract with him and owed him money 
as a result. Following a bench trial, the district court 
entered judgment for the defendant but in an amount that 
was substantially less than the amount of his counterclaim. 
The defendant appeals. We will affirm the judgment of the 
district court without further comment, as it is based upon 
that court's assessment of the evidence, and find no clear 
error.1 However, the jurisdictional issues raised by this 
appeal require us to discuss the district court's exercise of 
subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will discuss 
whether the amount in controversy requirement of 28 
U.S.C.A. S 1332(a) has been satisfied. 
 
I. 
 
Spectacor, a Pennsylvania joint venture engaged in the 
business of managing public assembly facilities, such as 
stadiums, arenas, and convention centers, brought this 
diversity action in an attempt to recoup severance benefits 
paid to defendant Matthew Brown, a New Jersey citizen, 
following his termination as Executive Vice-President of 
Spectacor. Spectacor's complaint alleged that it paid Brown 
$42,500 in benefits and $4,921.04 for medical insurance. 
The resulting total ($47,421.04) was, therefore, less than 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
the $50,000 minimum required for diversity jurisdiction 
when the suit was filed. Spectacor, however, also alleged 
that it was entitled to recoup an additional $3,287.21 it 
had paid in payroll taxes. This additional sum brought the 
amount that Spectacor claimed to $50,708.25 exclusive of 
costs and interest. 
 
Brown argues that Spectacor included the amount of the 
payroll taxes as a "sham" to manufacture federal 
jurisdiction in a preemptive attempt to prevent him from 
suing Spectacor in state court. Brown further argues that 
Spectacor conceded that even Spectacor's claim to recover 
benefits from Brown was a "sham" because Spectacor 
stipulated in the district court that it owed him $50,000 in 
benefits plus $15,692 in vacation pay. See Appellant's Br. 
at 5. Spectacor maintained that it retained the money that 
it owed Brown as a set off against payments it had made to 
Brown that he was obligated to repay. Thus, Brown's 
response to the suit was twofold. He claimed that Spectacor 
manipulated the payroll tax claim as a contrivance to 
manufacture the amount in controversy needed for diversity 
jurisdiction and that Spectacor owed him more than he 
owed it. However, rather than filing a motion to dismiss 
Spectacor's complaint for lack of jurisdiction in the district 
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Brown filed an answer 
in which he denied jurisdiction, and counterclaimed against 
Spectacor for the amount Spectacor allegedly owed him for 
severance pay ($135,000), sales commissions ($837,000), 
an earned bonus ($70,720), unused vacation days and 
unreimbursed business expenses ($17,550). 
 
Spectacor argues that it included payroll taxes in good 
faith and the jurisdictional amount therefore appears on 
the face of the complaint. Spectacor maintains that, in any 
event, Brown's counterclaim can be considered in 
calculating the amount in controversy. That counterclaim 
easily surpasses the $50,000 threshold needed for diversity 
jurisdiction. Brown counters by arguing that Spectacor's 
allegation of damages in the amount of $50,708.25 fails to 
satisfy the jurisdictional amount as the claim was not made 
in good faith and that his counterclaim cannot be 
considered in calculating the amount in controversy. 
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We hold that where, as here, a defendant elects not to file 
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, but answers a 
complaint by asserting a compulsory counterclaim, 2 the 
amount of that counterclaim may be considered by the 
court in determining if the amount in controversy exceeds 
the statutory requirement for diversity jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, since the amount in controversy easily clears 
the jurisdictional hurdle when Brown's counterclaims are 
included, we need not reach the novel and interesting issue 
of whether the payroll taxes can be considered in 
calculating the amount in controversy. 
 
II. 
 
Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction where there is 
complete diversity among the parties, and the amount in 
controversy meets the jurisdictional minimum. See 28 
U.S.C. S 1332(a). At the time this case wasfiled that 
amount was $50,000.3 As a general rule, that amount is 
determined from the good faith allegations appearing on the 
face of the complaint. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. 
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). A complaint will be 
deemed to satisfy the required amount in controversy 
unless the defendant can show to a legal certainty that the 
plaintiff cannot recover that amount. Id. at 289. 
 
       In a cause instituted in the federal court the plaintiff 
       chooses his forum. He knows or should know whether 
       his claim is within the statutory requirement as to 
       amount. His good faith in choosing the federal forum is 
       open to challenge not only by resort to the face of his 
       complaint, but by the facts disclosed at trial, and if 
       from either source it is clear that his claim never could 
       have amounted to the sum necessary to give 
       jurisdiction there is no injustice in dismissing the suit. 
 
Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 290. As noted above, Brown 
challenged the district court's jurisdiction by way of an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note that this case only presents the question of whether 
compulsory counterclaims can be considered. Our holding does not 
extend to permissive counterclaims. 
 
3. That amount has since been increased to $75,000. 
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averment in his answer. At P 16 of his answer, under the 
section of the answer captioned "DEFENSES", Brown 
states: "[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject 
matter in that the amount in controversy does not exceed 
$50,000.00." See app. at 16. Under Rule 12 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Brown could have filed a motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and not filed an answer 
unless that motion was denied. 
 
       Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any 
       pleading . . . shall be asserted in the responsive 
       pleading thereto if one is required except that the 
       following defenses may at the option of the pleader be 
       made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the 
       subject matter . . ." 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). Brown elected not to 
exercise that option. Instead, he asserted a counterclaim 
against Spectacor based upon the same transactions that 
gave rise to Spectacor's suit against him. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 provides in part as 
follows: 
 
       A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim 
       which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader 
       has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
       transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of 
       the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
       adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the 
       court cannot acquire jurisdiction . . . . 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13. Brown's claim against Spectacor is a 
compulsory counterclaim within the scope of this Rule. 
Where the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff 's claim 
require a defendant to assert a counterclaim under Rule 
13(a), defendant's claim is part of the controversy set forth 
in the plaintiff 's complaint. The complaint initiates the 
legal action, but it is not the totality of the controversy. It 
is merely the portion of the controversy for which plaintiff 
seeks relief. However, the substance of the controversy 
extends to any compulsory counterclaim brought under 
Rule 13(a).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The same is not true of counterclaims brought under Rule 13(b) as 
"permissive counterclaims" are simply "any claim against an opposing 
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       [I]f the jurisdictional amount requirement serves any 
       salutary function it is to measure the substantiality of 
       the claim. We believe that the substantiality of the 
       claim can best be gauged by reference to what is 
       actually at stake in the litigation rather than by strict 
       reference to plaintiff's claim for relief. 
 
1A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, 
P 0.167[8] (2d ed. 1991). 
 
The allegations of the instant suit demonstrate the 
wisdom of that approach. Spectacor alleges that it 
continued to pay Brown his salary and medical insurance 
after he was terminated "as an advance against the overall 
settlement then being negotiated." It maintains that such 
payments were a "demonstration of good faith and subject 
to reimbursement if agreement was not reached on all 
issues" regarding the termination of his employment. (See 
app. at 10; Compl. P 10.). Its suit is an attempt to recover 
those funds pursuant to the alleged agreement as 
settlement of the dispute was apparently never negotiated. 
Brown, on the other hand, asserts that Spectacor breached 
a contract in which it agreed to pay him certain amounts in 
the event that his employment was terminated, and that he 
was entitled to certain other payments by virtue of his 
performance while still employed at Spectacor. He 
specifically alleges that "[Spectacor] has breached the 
Employment Contract by not paying Brown sums 
[Spectacor] promised to pay upon his termination," (See 
app. at 18; Answer P 36), and "[Spectacor] has stopped 
Brown's medical insurance coverage, and it therefore owes 
him a yet to be liquidated sum for its replacement." (See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 party not arising out of the . . . occurrence that is the subject matter 
of 
the opposing party's claim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Thus, by definition, 
permissive counterclaims are not usually part of the controversy brought 
into court by plaintiff 's complaint. 
 
However, we do not today decide whether a permissive counterclaim 
could ever bear such a nexus to a plaintiff's claim as to allow a court to 
consider it in determining if the amount in controversy exceeded the 
jurisdictional amount. Resolution of that question must await a more 
appropriate case. 
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app. at 19; Answer P 37; see also app. at 19-20; Answer 
PP 38-43). 
 
Other courts have held that a compulsory counterclaim 
can satisfy the jurisdictional amount even where the 
defendant has not objected to jurisdiction. See Fenton v. 
Freedman, 748 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (considered 
counterclaim where defendant had not objected to 
jurisdiction prior to filing compulsory counterclaims); 
Roberts Mining & Milling Co. v. Schrader, 95 F.2d 522 (9th 
Cir. 1938) (considered counterclaim where defendant did 
not object to jurisdiction, but instead filed counterclaim in 
an amount adequate to support jurisdiction);5 Motorists 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1968) 
(holding that compulsory counterclaim was not to be 
considered where defendant objected to jurisdiction before 
filing a counterclaim, but noting that if no objection had 
been made, consideration of compulsory counterclaim was 
permissible).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the Roberts Mining court did not explicitly hold that the 
counterclaim was compulsory. However, the initial claim by the plaintiff 
was to quiet title to six mines while the counterclaim asserted that the 
mines were owned by the defendant. Such a counterclaim would be 
considered compulsory under the modern Rule 13(a). The claim was also 
compulsory under the procedural rules that prevailed at the time. While 
the decision was handed down in 1938, the year that the federal courts 
of equity and law were unified into the modern system governed by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the suit was filed prior to such 
unification and thus was one brought "in equity." 95 F.2d at 522. Such 
actions were governed by procedural rules that, unlike the rules 
governing actions at law, recognized compulsory counterclaims. See 
Equity Rule 30 (" `The answer must state in short and simple form any 
counterclaim arising out of the transaction which is the subject-matter 
of the suit ...."). American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 
360, 
365 (1922) (noting that it is imperative to limit the preclusive effect of 
counterclaims to those which are equitable, as opposed to legal in 
nature); Michael D. Conway, Narrowing of the Scope of Rule 13(a), 60 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 141, 154 (1993) ("Prior to 1938, there was no rule requiring 
the pleading of compulsory counterclaims at law.")(citing American Mills, 
supra). 
 
6. Spectacor also points to National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. 
Russell, 972 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1992), which held that where an insurer 
challenges an award under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act in 
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Prior to the 1938 unification of the law and equity courts 
and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this court held that a counterclaim of sufficient value could 
bring a case within the jurisdiction of the court regardless 
of the amount of plaintiff's claim. See Home Life Ins. Co. v. 
Sipp, 11 F.2d 474, 476 (3d Cir. 1926). 
 
In Home Life, Sipp was the beneficiary of a life insurance 
policy that the defendant insurance company had issued on 
her mother's life. Following her mother's death, Sipp sued 
to recover the amount of the policy ($3,000) plus interest 
and costs. At the time, a claim had to exceed $3,000 
exclusive of interest and costs to satisfy the amount 
required for diversity jurisdiction. The insurance company 
filed a counterclaim for a loan on the policy that remained 
outstanding in the amount of $423. Sipp subsequently 
attempted to amend her claim to include premiums that 
were paid for the period following her mother's death. 
However, the court ruled that the amount of "unearned 
premiums" could not be included as "the premium is 
earned the instant the risk attaches and is not returnable 
thereafter." Id. at 475. Moreover, even if the premium could 
be recovered, that amount would go to the estate of the 
deceased, and not to the plaintiff beneficiary. Thus, the 
amount of the premium could not count toward the 
jurisdictional minimum. Moreover, the amount of the 
counterclaim could not be added to the $3,000 claim to 
satisfy jurisdiction because the counterclaim was in the 
nature of a set-off to be subtracted from, not added to, any 
recovery. Accordingly, the counterclaim served only to 
reduce the amount in controversy. However, in deciding the 
case we stated: 
 
       when the jurisdictional amount is in question, the 
       tendering of a counterclaim in an amount which in 
       itself, or added to the amount claimed in the petition, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
federal court, the defendant's counterclaim could be considered for 
purposes of the jurisdictional amount. However, that case relies 
specifically on Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961), 
which 
dealt with the Texas Worker's Compensation Act and which, as 
discussed below, we do not rely upon here. See n.9 infra. 
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       makes up a sum equal to the amount necessary to the 
       jurisdiction of this court, jurisdiction is established, 
       whatever may be the state of the plaintiff's complaint. 
 
Id. 
 
Brown suggests that Home Life held that a counterclaim 
did not suffice to give a court jurisdiction where the 
plaintiff 's initial claim could not. See Appellant's Sup. Br. 
at 6. He points out that we also stated: "[a] party . . . 
cannot by filing a counterclaim give jurisdiction to a court 
when a statute denies it jurisdiction. In other words, a 
defendant's consent to the court's jurisdiction as to 
amount, signified by the filing of the counterclaim cannot 
confer jurisdiction." Home Life, 11 F.2d at 476. However, 
that portion of the opinion merely rejects plaintiff 's 
argument that defendant should be estopped from 
challenging jurisdiction once he or she pleads a 
counterclaim. It does not address the issue of whether the 
amount of the counterclaim is included in the amount in 
controversy for jurisdictional purposes. 
 
We concluded that the jurisdictional prerequisites were 
not satisfied in Home Life, because the counterclaim 
reduced the amount that the "defendant admits it owes" 
and was not an independent claim for recovery. 
Accordingly, we stated "[a]t no time and under no 
arrangement of the figures [had] the amount in controversy 
exceeded $3,000." Id. Although cases of such ancient 
vintage do not always guide subsequent inquiries with 
precision (especially in view of the evolving nature of federal 
jurisdiction), we think that our analysis in Home Life, along 
with similar holdings from our sister circuit courts of 
appeals, counsel us here. Cf. Fenton, 748 F.2d at 1359 
(holding that the circuit was bound to follow prior 1938 
precedent of Roberts Mining, which was considered a "suit 
in equity" and, like Home Life, was decided under 
procedural law applicable before the federal system was 
unified). Moreover, the discussion in Home Life remains 
viable under today's unified federal court system. 
 
Other courts have noted practical reasons for counting 
compulsory counterclaims toward the jurisdictional 
amount. In Roberts Mining, the court reasoned that 
                                 9 
 
 
 
consideration of the counterclaim was permissible because 
the counterclaim was the equivalent of a second, 
independent suit in which the defendant of the initial 
action was the plaintiff, 95 F.2d at 524 (citing Merchants' 
Heat & Light Co. v. James B. Clow & Sons, 204 U.S. 286 
(1907)), and that the matter in controversy was the same in 
each of these suits. Id. Therefore, because the court would 
have jurisdiction over this second suit, the court saw no 
impediment to asserting jurisdiction over the entirety of the 
initial action. Id. This reasoning is echoed in more recent 
cases where courts have noted that where there is no 
objection to jurisdiction and where the counterclaim 
independently meets the required amount, one can assume 
that the defendant would have chosen the federal forum 
and there is no reason not to exert jurisdiction simply 
because the plaintiff won the race to the courthouse. See 
Motorists Mutual Ins., 404 F.2d at 514-15.7 
 
Of course, we do not mean to suggest that parties can 
agree to the jurisdiction of a federal court and thereby 
confer jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist. That is 
clearly not the case. Federal jurisdiction arises under the 
constitution. It is not created by contract or waiver. In 
Fenton, the court stated: 
 
       [e]ach of the . . . compulsory counterclaims exceeded 
       $10,000. In Roberts Mining & Milling Co. v. Schrader, 
       we stated that a counterclaim that exceeded the 
       necessary amount in controversy was sufficient to 
       bring the entire case within the jurisdiction of the 
       district court, regardless of the lack of jurisdictional 
       averments in the . . . complaint . . . . The [defendants 
       here] did not object to the district court's exercise of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We realize that Brown is here arguing that he intended to sue in state 
court and that Spectacor raced into federal court as a preemptive strike 
to avail itself of a more favorable forum, see Appellant's Br. at 6, and 
therefore this presumption does not apply here. In the situation here, if 
Brown had sued in a Pennsylvania state court, Spectacor, as a 
Pennsylvania citizen, would not have been able to remove the case to the 
district court. See 28 U.S.C. S 1441(b). Nevertheless, these policy 
implications are still relevant to our discussion. In noting them, we do 
not suggest that there is any merit to the belief of either party here 
that 
a federal or state forum will benefit either side. 
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       jurisdiction prior to the filing of their compulsory 
       counterclaim but, rather, raised the issue for thefirst 
       time on appeal. 
 
748 F.2d at 1358 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). However, the court could not have intended to 
suggest that jurisdiction can be waived. Rather, we 
conclude that the court was simply noting that the 
defendants there had done nothing to prevent the amount 
of their counterclaim from becoming part of the controversy 
that was initiated by the plaintiff's suit, and that the 
counterclaim was therefore properly considered in 
determining the amount in controversy. Similarly, Brown 
did object to jurisdiction, but he did not do so in a manner 
that kept his counterclaim from being before the court. 
When a defendant elects that option afforded under Rule 12 
and decides not to move to dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, but asserts a compulsory counterclaim 
against the plaintiff instead, the defendant thereby places 
the amount of the counterclaim into controversy, and the 
court must consider that amount in determining if it has 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. S 1332(a). This is true 
whether or not the defendant also attacks subject matter 
jurisdiction in his or her answer or in any other manner 
that does not prevent the counterclaim from being before 
the court.8 
 
In arguing that we should not consider compulsory 
counterclaims, Brown also points to Oliver v. Haas, 777 F. 
Supp. 1040 (D.P.R. 1991); Michael F. Ronca & Sons, Inc. v. 
Monarch Water Systems, 1990 WL 140154 (E.D. Pa. 1990); 
P.S. Group v. Aladdin Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc., 
1990 WL 122938 (E.D. Pa. 1990); and Cabe v. Pennwalt, 
372 F. Supp. 780 (W.D.N.C. 1974). See Appellant's Sup. Br. 
at 6. Each of these cases was decided in the context of 
removal and each holds that counterclaims cannot be 
considered when determining whether an action has been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Here, in addition to a statement in his answer challenging 
jurisdiction, 
Brown subsequently moved for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 when, 
in response to Brown's summary judgment motion, Spectacor conceded 
that it owed Brown more than he owed it. See Appellant's Br. at 6. 
However, that does not alter our analysis. 
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properly removed. Although there is authority to the 
contrary, see, e.g., Swallow & Assoc. v. Henry Molded 
Products, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding 
that in the removal context "substantiality of claim" should 
be gauged by considering the compulsory counterclaim), 
the cases to which Brown points appear to represent the 
majority view that inclusion of counterclaims should not be 
permitted in the removal context. Wright, supra, at 124 
(collecting cases). However, removal is governed by 
considerations inapplicable to cases involving the exercise 
of original jurisdiction. In Shamrock Oil Corp. v. Sheets, 313 
U.S. 100, 107-109 (1941), the Supreme Court noted that 
the legislative history and language of the removal statute 
shows that Congress intended to limit removal. The Court 
reasoned that removal was statutory and not constitutional, 
and that removal jurisdiction must, therefore, be narrowly 
construed in favor of the non-removing party to prevent, 
inter alia, encroachment on the right of state courts to 
decide cases properly before them. The contrary 
consideration is present when we consider a court's 
exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, in the abstention 
context, the Court has stated: 
 
       [T]he federal courts have a virtually unflagging 
       obligation to exercise their jurisdiction except in those 
       extraordinary circumstances where the order to the 
       parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve 
       an important countervailing interest. 
 
Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, "if compulsory 
counterclaims were considered for purposes of jurisdiction, 
federal subject matter jurisdiction would be reliant on state 
law distinctions between compulsory and permissive 
counterclaims." Meridian Aviation Service v. Sun Jet Int'l, 
886 F.Supp. 613, 615 (S.D.Tex. 1995). Accordingly, Brown's 
reliance upon cases addressing issues surrounding removal 
jurisdiction does not assist us. 
 
Here, Brown submitted his compulsory counterclaim to 
the district court thereby putting the amount of that 
counterclaim in controversy. The amount of his 
counterclaim must be considered in determining whether 
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the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. See also 
Horton, 367 U.S. 348 (1961).9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Horton an insurance company filed suit in federal court, alleging 
diversity jurisdiction, to challenge a $1,050 award given by the Texas 
Industrial Accident Board pursuant to the Texas Workman's 
Compensation Act. In its complaint, the company also asserted that the 
defendant would assert a compulsory counterclaim that he was entitled 
to an award of $14,035. In response, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy and filed an 
answer, subject to the motion to dismiss, containing the $14,035 
conditional compulsory counterclaim just as plaintiff had predicted. 
Although the amount of the insurance company's claim clearly did not 
meet the amount in controversy minimum that was then an amount in 
excess of $10,000, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional 
requirement was met because of the $14,035 counterclaim. The Court 
stated: 
 
       The complaint of the respondent company filed in the District 
Court, 
       while denying any liability at all and asking that the award of 
       $1,050 against it be set aside, also alleges that petitioner Horton 
       has claimed, now claims and will claim that he has suffered total 
       and permanent disability and is entitled to a maximum recovery of 
       $14,035, which, of course, is in excess of the $10,000 requisite to 
       give a federal court jurisdiction of this controversy. No denial of 
       these allegations in the complaint has been made, no attempted 
       disclaimer or surrender of any part of the original claim has been 
       made by petitioner, and there has been no other showing, let alone 
       a showing `to a legal certainty,' of any lack of good faith on the 
part 
       of the respondent in alleging that a $14,035 claim is in 
controversy. 
       It would contradict the whole record as well as the allegations of 
the 
       complaint to say that this dispute involves only $1,050. The claim 
       before the [Texas Industrial Accident] Board was $14,035; the state 
       court suit of petitioner asked that much; the conditional 
       counterclaim in the federal court claims the same amount. Texas 
       law under which this claim was created and has its being leaves the 
       entire $14,035 claim open for adjudication in a de novo court 
trial, 
       regardless of the award. Thus the record before us shows beyond a 
       doubt that the award is challenged by both parties and is binding 
       on neither; that petitioner claims more than $10,000 from the 
       respondent and the respondent denies it should have to pay 
       petitioner anything at all. No matter which party brings it into 
court, 
       the controversy remains the same; it involves the same amount of 
       money and is to be adjudicated and determined under the same 
       rules. Unquestionably, therefore, the amount in controversy is in 
       excess of $10,000. 
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III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
367 U.S. at 353-54. 
 
As the dissent noted, Horton can be read as holding that if a plaintiff 
asserts in the complaint that a counterclaim will be brought in an 
amount above the jurisdictional minimum, then the amount in 
controversy has been satisfied. Yet, that is clearly contrary to the well- 
established rule (developed in the context of federal question 
jurisdiction) 
that a plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction by anticipating 
federal 
defenses that a defendant may assert. See id. at 358-59 (citing Skelly Oil 
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); First National Bank of 
Canton, Pa. v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504 (1920); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. 
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914)). 
 
Perhaps because Horton has so troubled commentators and courts, it 
has been conspicuously absent from discussions of the effect of 
counterclaims upon the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Fenton, 748 
F.2d 1358; Motorists Mutual, 404 F.2d 511. Only two reported cases 
outside the Texas Compensation Act context cite Horton in regard to the 
counterclaims and the jurisdictional amount. See  Emland Builders, Inc. 
v. Shea, 359 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966); Russell, 972 F.2d 628. In 
Emland Builders, the court found Horton to be of dubious instruction 
and held that, in any event, the complaint sufficed to meet the 
jurisdictional requirement. 
 
Although the holding in Horton supports our analysis, we need not rely 
upon it for the decision we reach here. (Horton  has been described as 
"baffling" by respected legal commentators, see Wright, supra at 111, 
and we include it only for the sake of the thoroughness of our 
discussion). 
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WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I respectfully dissent from the decision in this case based 
on what I believe to be a serious question about lack of 
jurisdiction. Spectacor proceeded in the federal court in its 
chosen venue, asserting diversity jurisdiction and more 
than the required jurisdictional amount, but only barely, on 
the face of the complaint. The defendant Brown filed an 
answer affirmatively stating "[t]he Court lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter in that the amount of controversy 
does not exceed $50,000." He added, among other things: 
 
        Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim upon which 
       relief can be granted. 
 
        . . . 
 
        Plaintiff was already obligated to provide the sums 
       and benefits to Defendant. 
 
        . . . 
 
        Plaintiff's Complaint was filed in bad faith to harass 
       Defendant. 
 
Defendant contemporaneously filed a counterclaim, seeking 
a substantially greater amount than was requested in the 
original complaint. 
 
The district court found that the action was notfiled in 
bad faith because "[s]ums owed by a plaintiff to the 
defendant are not subtracted from the amount of plaintiff's 
claim when calculating the jurisdictional amount. Savarese 
v. Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc., 513 F.2d 140, 142 (9th 
Cir. 1975)." In my view, however, the facts of Savarese are 
materially different from those presented by the 
jurisdictional issue in this case. In that case, the plaintiff 
sought $11,901 from the defendant who did not contest the 
claim. Additionally, the plaintiff acknowledged that he held 
some $2,578 that belonged to the defendant, which he 
sought to apply against the debt owed him. The defendant 
conceded that the amount sought by Savarese was above 
the jurisdictional minimum amount.1 The defendant did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Savarese court acknowledged that had plaintiff initially demanded 
a judgment of $9,323 (the difference after application of an offset), the 
district court would have lacked jurisdiction, citing Kansas City 
Philharmonic Ass'n v. Greyhound Lines, 257 F.Supp. 941 (W.D. Mo. 
1966); C. Wright, Federal Courts, 116-17 and n.52, 134 (2d ed. 1970). 
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challenge, in a timely fashion, jurisdiction in its responsive 
pleading. 
 
In the instant case, even if Brown had not pleaded lack 
of jurisdiction, a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is 
not waivable; and when a challenge is made, it must be 
fully considered. United States ex rel Coffey v. Austin 
Construction, 436 F.Supp. 626 (W.D. Okla. 1977). Whether 
federal jurisdiction exists is determined as of the time the 
action is filed, not after the responsive pleading is filed. 
Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Vol. 13B S 3608, Vol. 14A S 3702. The party seeking to 
invoke federal jurisdiction, once challenged, "has the 
burden of proving its existence." Id., S 3702. 
 In a suit for a sum certain that is less than the 
jurisdictional amount, adding a claim for punitive damages 
so that the jurisdictional amount may be exceeded may be 
insufficient to establish jurisdiction. Wiggins v. N.A. 
Equitable Life Ins. Co., 644 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1981). 
Furthermore, "the extent to which a counterclaim can be 
considered in determining the amount in controversy never 
has been determined satisfactorily by the federal courts." 
Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Vol. 14, S 3706. "Defendant can object to the court's 
jurisdiction over the original claim in the answer and plead 
the counterclaim in the alternative." Id., S 3706. 
 
Here, the district court acknowledged that Spectacor 
admitted "that it does not `own' the set-off funds," but, 
rather than holding that that fact barred the claim, the 
court held that Spectacor took a "strategic action" to 
"obtain what it perceives to be a more amenable forum." 
Brown argued (I think plausibly) that Spectacor genuinely 
claimed only $47,421 in "salary advances" and "medical 
insurance premiums" made for his benefit. Brown 
complained, however, about the asserted "payroll tax 
liabilities" of $3,287, arguing that this additional claim was 
a " `sham' to manufacture federal court jurisdiction." The 
district court never decided whether, in fact, the so-called 
"payroll tax liability" portion of the complaint, which was 
necessary to exceed the jurisdictional amount of $50,000 
was something other than a "sham" or a "contrivance" to 
establish federal jurisdiction. The district court merely held, 
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without elaboration, that the suit was filed in good faith 
and not for the purpose of harassing the defendant. 
 
The majority holds that because defendant did not file a 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and asserted a 
compulsory counterclaim, that it would consider the 
amount of the counterclaim in determining the amount in 
controversy, citing Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d 358 (9th 
Cir. 1984). But, as the majority acknowledged, Fenton 
involved a situation where defendant had not first objected 
to jurisdiction. It is therefore distinguishable from this case, 
as is the earlier Ninth Circuit case, Roberts Mining Co. v. 
Schrader, 95 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1996), for the same reason. 
 
The remaining case cited by the majority for this 
jurisdictional holding was Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
Simpson, 404 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1969). That court held 
contrary to the majority's interpretation: 
 
        When a claim over which there is otherwise 
       jurisdiction does not embrace an amount in 
       controversy in excess of that required by the statute, 
       the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule, under which jurisdiction 
       is determined on the basis of what the plaintiff claims, 
       requires dismissal of the claim. A problem arises, 
       however, when although the plaintiff 's claim does not 
       involve the requisite jurisdictional amount, a 
       compulsory counterclaim is filed which independently 
       meets the required amount. There are cases which 
       hold that in such a situation federal jurisdiction should 
       be sustained. 
 
        But irrespective of the holding in those cases, we 
       believe that a compulsory counterclaim should not be 
       held to give rise to federal jurisdiction where the 
       defendant-counterclaimant has objected from the 
       beginning to the federal court's assumption of 
       jurisdiction over the plaintiff's main action on the 
       ground that the amount in controversy in that action 
       is insufficient and additionally, after his jurisdictional 
       objection is overruled, files a compulsory counterclaim 
       even though the amount therein involved exceeds 
       $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 
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Simpson, 404 F.2d at 514 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 
The Simpson court, moreover, in the type of situation 
existing in this case, observed that "[s]ince, however, 
defendant did not originally choose the federal forum, the 
option should be his whether or not to keep the action in 
federal court," citing 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice P 0.98[1], 
at 896 (2d ed. 1964). Simpson held that it was without 
jurisdiction to proceed unless the original claim exceeded 
the jurisdictional amount. I would agree with this 
assessment, and I would question the authority of Home 
Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926), to the 
extent that it indicates a contrary rule.2  
 
The majority properly concedes that there is a "well- 
established rule" that a plaintiff cannot create federal 
jurisdiction by anticipating federal defenses. Like the 
majority, I perceive no persuasive basis for considering 
Horton v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961), as 
authority in this case. The district court made no reference 
to any of these authorities except Savarese, which is easily 
distinguishable. 
 
In my view, the determinative question as to adequacy of 
the jurisdictional amount asserted in the complaint has not 
been determined. Spectacor could have filed a declaratory 
judgment action to have avoided these problems, but it did 
not. It also could have sought removal from state court to 
federal court had Brown sued as he indicated he would. I 
disagree with the majority view that Brown should lose the 
jurisdictional argument because he did not file a motion to 
dismiss, when he objected to the court's jurisdiction 
affirmatively in his answer. Federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction, and I believe we should strictly 
construe jurisdictional requirements. 
 
The question of whether "payroll tax liability" is a proper 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I would agree that Sipp correctly held that neither unearned premiums 
nor a policy loan could be added to the then minimum jurisdictional 
amount requirement ($3,000 plus) involving a $3,000 face amount life 
insurance policy to establish federal jurisdiction; and (2) filing of the 
defendant's counterclaim could not confer jurisdiction. 
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claim against Brown is a novel one and I see no easy 
answer. Was this liability actually paid or incurred, or was 
it a mere bookkeeping entry? Did it constitute a part of the 
"advance" to Brown? Was Brown liable to repay that 
amount to Spectacor, the IRS, or the State, if Spectacor had 
later deemed the salary to have been erroneously paid? In 
addition, I would call upon the district court to consider the 
"good faith" question in view of the circumstances and give 
an explanation for its determination in this regard. I would, 
therefore, REMAND to the district court for a thorough 
consideration of the jurisdictional issue for the reasons 
stated. 
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       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                19 
 
